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Multiple founders and firm value 
 
 
 
Abstract: 
We highlight a new category of firms, multi-founder firms, which were founded by multiple 
individuals (with no family connections) who are still actively involved in the firm as 
directors and/or managers (e.g., Google and Yahoo). These firms provide a unique setting to 
shed further light on the net valuation effects of founder involvement. In particular, multi-
founder firms provide us with the opportunity to examine the benefits and costs to 
shareholders of multiple founders involved as directors, CEOs and managers in the same firm. 
Our analysis indicates that multi-founder firms are more valuable than all other types of firms, 
including single-founder firms and family firms, with the valuation premium positively 
related to the number of founders involved in the firm. Further analysis confirms that this 
valuation premium is linked to the direct involvement of the multiple founders as directors 
and CEOs. However, further founder involvement in vice president positions has a negative 
relationship with firm value. 
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1. Introduction 
A number of prior studies document a significant benefit to having a firm founder involved as 
a CEO, director or chairman (Fahlenbrach, 2009; Li and Srinivasan, 2011; Villalonga and 
Amit, 2006). This net benefit to shareholders is based on the benefits of founder involvement 
(e.g. long-term wealth creation, active monitoring, firm-specific knowledge) exceeding the 
potential costs (e.g. entrenchment, consumption of private benefits). However, this may not 
always be the case. Johnson et al. (1985) document a positive share price reaction to founder 
deaths, which suggests that shareholders view the departure of founders as good news. In 
addition, as prior studies have only examined the involvement of a single founder in each 
firm, there is limited evidence to compare the effect of founder involvement in different firm 
positions (e.g. founder directors, founder CEOs and founder managers). 
In this paper, we highlight a previously unstudied category of firms – multi-founder 
firms – which provide us with a unique setting to shed further light on the net valuation 
effects of founder involvement. In particular, multi-founder firms provide us with the 
opportunity to examine the benefits and costs to shareholders of multiple founder 
involvement in the same firm. We define multi-founder firms as firms that were founded by 
multiple individuals (with no family connections) who are still actively involved in the firm 
as directors and/or managers. This type of firm is common in the technology sector and 
occurs in a number of countries around the world. Some well-known examples of multi-
founder firms are Google and Yahoo. 
Whether there are incremental benefits or costs of additional founder involvement is 
an open question. First, it is unknown whether the documented benefits of a single founder 
also incrementally apply to additional founders (e.g., second, third and fourth founder). 
Second, it is also unknown whether multiple founders collude together to consume private 
benefits of control (similar to large controlling shareholders) or if they act more like 
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independent blockholders monitoring each other’s actions. In this study we test for the net 
valuation effect of multiple founder involvement in firms to determine whether multiple 
founders provide a net benefit or cost to shareholders. As multiple founder firms also provide 
us with a unique opportunity to examine the effect of founder involvement in multiple firm 
positions, we also conduct analysis to simultaneously determine the relationships between 
founder directors, founder CEOs, founder managers (vice presidents) and firm value. 
In our analysis we specifically test the value of multi-founder firms relative to 
different categories of firms – all other firms, all family-controlled and individual-controlled 
firms as a group, family (founder involved) firms and individual (founder involved) firms. 
These last two comparisons allow us to determine whether multi-founder firms are similar to 
family firms (if the multiple founders collude together like a family group) and whether 
multi-founder firms provide any incremental benefits over single-founder firms.  
Our results show that multi-founder firms are more valuable than all other types of 
firms (including family firms and single-founder firms), with the valuation premium 
positively related to the number of founders involved in the firm. This indicates that multiple 
founders provide net benefits to shareholders and the greater the number of founders the 
greater the benefit. Further analysis confirms that this valuation premium is linked to the 
direct involvement of the multiple founders as directors and CEOs. However, further founder 
involvement in vice president positions has a negative relationship with firm value.  
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 details the prior 
literature and Section 3 develops hypotheses. Section 4 explains the sample selection and 
provides descriptive statistics. Section 5 provides our univariate and multivariate analysis. 
Section 6 states conclusions, the major contributions of this paper and avenues for future 
research. 
 
4 
 
2. Literature Review 
Founder involvement in firms can provide both benefits and costs to shareholders. Founders 
often consider the firm as their life’s achievement, with their long-term view making them 
more likely to pursue long-term wealth creation for shareholders, rather than concentrating on 
short-term actions or “enjoying the quiet life” (Stein, 1989; James, 1999; Bertrand and 
Mullainathan, 2003). Founders are also more likely to possess organizational-specific skills 
that are critical to the success of the company and have more influence and decision-making 
power within the firm (Fama and Jensen, 1983; Adams et al., 2005). Founders also have an 
incentive, due to their considerable ownership positions, to reduce principal-agent problems 
by maintaining high levels of monitoring (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Li and Srinivasan, 
2011).  
 However, it is also possible for founders to use their power and position within the 
firm to extract private benefits of control. This can occur through a number of channels, such 
as excessive compensation, related party transactions, special dividends, risk avoidance and 
remaining active in management even when they are no longer competent to run the company 
(Anderson and Reeb, 2003; Anderson et al., 2003). Anderson et al. (2009) also find that firms 
with founder involvement are significantly more opaque than other firms and that founders 
exploit opacity to extract private benefits at the expense of other shareholders. The net effect 
of founder involvement is therefore uncertain and has been the subject of numerous studies.  
Early studies examining the relationship between founder involvement and firm 
performance focused on family firms, with Anderson and Reeb (2003) and Maury (2006) 
finding that family firms in the US and Europe perform better than non-family firms, 
particularly if the CEO position is held by a family member. Villalonga and Amit (2006) 
clarify this relationship by showing that family firms only outperform when they have a 
5 
 
founder CEO. Family firms with descendent family CEOs perform worse than non-family 
firms.  
 Subsequent research has specifically focused on the role of founding individuals, 
rather than founding families, and has provided evidence that lone founder involvement 
provides a net benefit to shareholders (Miller et al., 2007). Fahlenbrach (2009) examines the 
investment decisions of founder CEOs and find that they invest more in research and 
development and have higher capital expenditures, which contribute to higher market 
valuations and better stock market performance. To address endogeneity concerns, Adams et 
al. (2009) use an instrumental variable approach and confirm that causation runs from 
founder CEO involvement to firm performance.  
 Two studies have also examined the effect of founder involvement as chairmen and 
directors. Villalonga and Amit (2006) examine the impact of founder chairmen and find a 
positive valuation effect when a family firm is headed by a founder chairman. Li and 
Srinivasan (2011) examine the role played by founder directors. They identify firms where 
founders are only involved as directors and not as CEOs or other executives, and find that 
firms with founder directors have higher CEO pay for performance and turnover sensitivities, 
higher board attendance, make better acquisition decisions and have higher firm value.  
 However, while these studies provide evidence that founder involvement is associated 
with a net benefit to shareholders, this may not always be the case. Johnson et al. (1985) 
examine the market reaction to the sudden death of corporate executives (predominantly 
chairmen and CEOs) and find a positive market reaction to the sudden death of corporate 
founders. This suggests that shareholders view the departure of founders as good news. There 
is also evidence that the effect of founder involvement on firm value depends on the position 
the founder holds in the firm. Li and Srinivasan (2011) examine the effects of founder CEOs 
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and founder directors, and find that while firms with founder directors have higher value, 
firms with founder CEOs are no more valuable than other firms.   
 
3. Hypothesis Development 
In this study we extend the literature by examining the effect of multiple founders on firm 
value, rather than the focus of past research on an individual founder. There are potentially 
both incremental benefits and incremental costs to shareholders of multiple founder 
involvement. The first potential incremental benefit is the marginal effect of an additional 
founder’s involvement on firm activities and performance (e.g., long-term wealth creation 
and internal monitoring, as described above for a single founder). Prior studies generally 
document a significant positive effect for a single founder. Whether the involvement of 
additional founders (e.g., second, third and fourth founder) has an incremental effect beyond 
the first founder is unknown.  
The second potential incremental benefit is the monitoring the additional founders 
conduct on each other. The multiple founders can be likened to blockholders that are actively 
involved in the firm’s operations. Even though the founders have all been involved in the 
firm since its inception (indicating a strong ability to be able to work together), their 
ownership interests are generally held in personal accounts, providing a strong incentive to 
monitor each other’s actions. A number of studies from the blockholder literature document a 
positive valuation effect in firms that possess multiple blockholders, indicating that 
blockholders play a valuable monitoring role (Lins, 2003; Maury and Pajuste, 2005; Laeven 
and Levine, 2008; Attig et al., 2009). If the multiple founders act as independent monitors of 
each other’s actions, then shareholders could expect to obtain positive valuation effects, 
similar to those documented in the blockholder literature. 
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 However, it is also possible that the multiple founders collude together to consume 
private benefits of control, which results in incremental costs to shareholders. Zwiebel (2005) 
shows that moderate-sized blockholders are prone to be in cahoots with each other to 
consume private benefits. This situation is similar to the heightened agency costs documented 
in firms with large controlling shareholders, particularly firms controlled by family groups. 
Numerous prior studies of controlling shareholders show negative valuation effects in firms 
with owners who have the potential to consume private benefits of control (e.g., Claessens et 
al., 2002; Faccio and Lang, 2002). If the multiple founders act together to the detriment of 
other shareholders, then shareholders may incur negative valuation effects, similar to those 
documented in the controlling shareholder literature. 
In this study we test for the net valuation effect of multiple founder involvement in 
firms. We specifically test the value of multi-founder firms relative to different categories of 
firms, including sub-groups of family firms and single-founder firms, to isolate the 
incremental valuation effect of multiple founder involvement. Multiple founder firms also 
provide us with a unique opportunity to simultaneously examine the effect of founder 
involvement in multiple firm positions. Hence, we also conduct analysis to simultaneously 
determine the relationships between founder directors, founder CEOs, founder managers 
(vice presidents) and firm value. 
 
4. Data 
4.1 Sample 
In our analysis we use a sample of listed firms from the Taiwan Stock Exchange. There are 
three reasons for this selection. First, undertaking this research in an emerging market 
provides a richer setting to examine the net valuation effect of founder involvement. 
Emerging markets, such as Taiwan, are characterised by concentrated ownership and weak 
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investor protection, which are associated with greater opportunity for controlling owners to 
consume private benefits of control (Claessens et al., 2002).1 Second, since multi-founder 
firms are most prevalent in the technology sector, we need a sample market with a large 
technology sector to obtain a sufficient sample of multi-founder firms. Approximately half of 
the listed firms on the Taiwan Stock Exchange are in the electronics sector (see Table 1). 
Third, listed firms in Taiwan are subject to disclosure regulations that require firms to report 
the original appointment dates of directors and executives, and family relationships between 
directors and executives in annual reports. This allows us to specifically identify firm 
founders and to identify whether firms are being controlled by an individual, a group of 
unrelated individuals, a family group, a government organization or another company.2   
 Similar to other emerging markets, firms listed on the Taiwan Stock Exchange are 
characterised by large controlling shareholders, usually family groups, who are actively 
involved on the board of directors and in management. Taiwan has a German civil law origin 
and a strong traditional Chinese culture with an emphasis on family values. Corporate boards 
in Taiwan are comprised of directors and supervisors. Directors and supervisors are both 
elected by shareholders at annual meetings and generally serve a 3-year term. Supervisors, 
however, do not have formal voting rights in board decisions. Their purpose is to 
“independently” monitor the activities of the board, but in effect they are generally 
representatives of the firm’s major shareholders. In our analysis, we include both directors 
                                                            
1 This suggests that the potential costs of founder involvement (e.g. private benefits) are higher in emerging 
markets (with weaker investor protection), which makes it more difficult to find a net benefit of founder 
involvement for shareholders. 
2 This is the only market we are aware of that mandates the disclosure of family relationships (first and second 
degree) in annual reports. This means we have clear data on whether directors/executives are brothers, sisters, 
cousins, etc, or are not related to each other. To identify multi-founder firms we need to be certain that the 
founders have no family relationships (otherwise they are classified as family firms), which is much easier to 
determine in Taiwan than other markets.  
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and supervisors as board members are they are both involved in the monitoring and advising 
functions of the board.  
Our cross-sectional sample comprises 716 firms listed on the Taiwan Stock Exchange 
that provided annual reports to the exchange for the year 2007 and have financial and 
ownership data available from the Taiwan Economic Journal (TEJ) database.3 To categorize 
firms, we identify the original founders of each firm and examine the composition of the 
board of directors in 2007. Founders are identified from their original appointment dates and 
company histories in annual reports and confirmed using internet searches. We identify the 
controlling group/individual in each firm as the group/individual with highest number of 
board seats (including seats held directly and through representatives).4  
Multi-founder firms are identified as firms that were founded by multiple individuals 
with no family relationships and the same group or a subgroup of the same founders control 
the firm in 2007. We group the multiple founders together as a controlling group since they 
founded the firm together (similar to the way a family group is identified as founding a 
family firm). Family firms are firms where a family group is in control. A family group is 
defined as more than one family member on the board of directors or in top management. 
Individual firms are where an individual is in control and there is no involvement by their 
other family members on the board of directors or in top management. Company firms are 
firms where another company is in control and the ultimate ownership of that company 
cannot be traced to a particular controlling shareholder. Government firms are firms where a 
                                                            
3 We generally rely on TEJ data for ownership variables except where we classify firms differently to the TEJ 
database. For multi-founder, family and individual firms we manually check all shareholdings to ensure we only 
include shareholdings held by the controlling group. In some cases the TEJ database includes all shareholdings 
of entities with board seats as affiliated with the controlling group. 
4 In nearly all cases, the group with the largest number of board seats is also the largest shareholder. However, 
since some shareholders hold a large number of board seats with a relatively small ownership interest (e.g. less 
than 5%) a minimum ownership restriction is not the best way to establish control in our sample.  
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state entity is in control. Widely held firm are firms where no identifiable person or group 
holds more than one board seat. 
 Consistent with Villalonga and Amit (2006, 2010), family and individual firms are 
further categorized as founder involved, founder not involved and acquired. For example, a 
family (founder involved) firm is one in which the family group in control in 2007 was also 
involved in originally founding the firm and a founding family member is still involved on 
the board of directors or in management in 2007. A family (founder not involved) firm is one 
in which the family group in control in 2007 was also involved in originally founding the 
firm but all founding family members are no longer involved on the board of directors or in 
management in 2007. This could also be called a second-generation family firm. Acquired 
family firms are firms where a family group is in control in 2007 but the family group was 
not involved in founding the firm. 
 Table 1 provides details of firm categories and industry composition.5 The sample 
includes 43 multi-founder firms, 537 family-controlled firms, 63 individual-controlled firms, 
35 company-controlled firms, 25 government-controlled firms and 13 widely-held firms. Of 
the multi-founder firms, 88 percent are in the electronics sector and the remaining 12 percent 
in the industrials sector. This significant presence in the electronics sector is also seen in 
individual-controlled firms and widely-held firms. Family-controlled firms, company-
controlled firms and government-controlled firms are more diversified across the different 
industry sectors.  
 Our analysis also includes a time-series sample of multi-founder and individual 
(founder involved) firms over the period 2001 to 2007. This sample includes the same 90 
firms from our cross-sectional sample. The number of firm-year observations in this analysis 
                                                            
5 Industry categories from the Taiwan Stock Exchange are grouped as follows. Electronics (13-20), Materials 
(1,8-11,21), Consumer Goods (2,24,26), Industrials (3-7,12,22,23,27) and Financial (25).  
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is 292 for multi-founder firms and 328 for individual (founder involved) firms. Due to the 
intensive data collection required for each firm-year observation this time-series sample is 
limited to multi-founder and individual (founder involved) firms.  
 
4.2 Descriptive Statistics 
Summary statistics of the cross-sectional sample are shown in Table 2. Tobin’s Q is 
calculated as total assets minus the book value of equity plus the market value of equity all 
divided by total assets. Industry-adjusted Tobin’s Q is raw Tobin’s Q divided by industry 
average Tobin’s Q. Total assets is in billions of NT dollars. Age is the number of years since 
the firm was founded. Ownership variables are calculated following the methodology of 
Claessens et al. (2000). Ownership is the percentage cashflow rights ownership of the 
controlling group.6 Control wedge is the ratio of control to cashflow rights of the controlling 
group. A control wedge of greater than one represents excess control rights. Board size is the 
number of directors and supervisors on the board. Board control is the percentage of board 
positions held by the controlling group. Board independence is the percentage of independent 
directors and supervisors on the board. Chair-CEO duality is the percentage of firms where 
the same person holds both positions. Debt is total debt divided by total assets. Fixed assets is 
PP&E divided by total assets. Growth is 1-year growth in total assets as a percentage. ROA is 
return on assets as a percentage. Tobin’s Q and other firm financial characteristics (debt, 
fixed assets, growth, ROA) are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles. 
 Table 2 shows that the average sample firm has a Tobin’s Q of 1.18 and industry-
adjusted Tobin’s Q of 1.00. Average size is NT$29.80 billion (≈US$1 billion) and average 
                                                            
6 In multi-founder firms the ownership of the controlling group includes the ownership of all founders. As a 
robustness check we also conduct our analysis using only the ownership of the largest founder shareholder with 
no effect on the reported results.    
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age is 27.05 years. The controlling group has average ownership of 22.92 percent and a 
control wedge of 1.56. Average board size is 9.96, with the controlling group holding 47.68 
percent of board positions and 11.09 percent of the positions held by independent outsiders. 
The chairperson is also the CEO in 33.10 percent of firms. The mean sample firm has a debt 
ratio of 0.56, fixed asset ratio of 0.11, growth of 14.30 percent and return on assets of 9.75 
percent. Differences in firm characteristics between firm categories are examined in the 
following section. 
 Table 3 provides details of the ownership, board and management composition of 
multi-founder firms. There are on average 2.86 founders involved in the 43 multi-founder 
firms. This ranges from 2 to 7 as displayed in Figure 1. There are 22 firms with 2 founders, 
11 firms with 3 founders, 6 firms with 4 founders, 3 firms with 5 founders and 1 firm with 7 
founders involved. Total ownership for all founders as a group is, on average, 16.39 percent 
of outstanding shares, ranging from 1.49 percent to 41.08 percent. Ranking founders by their 
ownership interest, Founder 1 has average ownership of 7.97 percent, Founder 2 has average 
ownership of 4.15 percent, Founder 3 has average ownership of 3.09 percent, Founder 4 has 
average ownership of 2.50 percent, Founder 5 has average ownership of 1.79 percent, 
Founder 6 has ownership of 1.23 percent and Founder 7 has ownership of 0.48 percent. There 
are also 7 firms with founders holding joint ownership of 20.25 percent of outstanding shares 
in a jointly-owned entity.  
 The multiple founders as a group hold on average 3.63 board positions, ranging from 
2 to 8 board positions. The majority of founders hold one board seat each but there are 
instances of founders holding up to four board seats through the use of representatives. In five 
firms where founders hold ownership through a joint entity, these entities on average hold 
two additional board seats occupied by representatives. In 35 out of 43 firms, the founders are 
also involved in management. Overall, there is an average of 1.56 founders involved in 
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management. The proportion of founders involved in management is 60 percent for Founder 
1, 51 percent for Founder 2, 62 percent for Founder 3, 30 percent for Founder 4, 75 percent 
for Founder 5 and 0 percent for Founders 6 and 7. 
 These descriptive statistics of multi-founder firms show that even though founder 1 
ownership is roughly double that of founder 2 ownership (and even higher relative to founder 
3-7 ownership) there is little evidence that founder 1 is using their higher ownership stake to 
hold more positions on the board or in management. Among the 43 multi-founder firms, the 
most extreme case is a firm where founder 1 has four board seats relative to one board seat 
for founder 2. However, in this firm founder 2 is the CEO and founder 1 is not involved in 
management. Thus, in our sample of multi-founder firms the multiple founders have similar 
levels of involvement in the firm and there is no evidence of a dominant founder.  
  
5. Empirical Analysis 
5.1 Univariate Tests 
In this section, we examine the characteristics of multi-founder firms relative to other 
categories of firms. A number of different groups of firms are used for comparison to ensure 
we find a close match to the observed (and potentially unobserved) characteristics of multi-
founder firms. We compare multi-founder firms to all other types of firms, to all family and 
individual controlled firms, and then to family (founder involved) firms and individual 
(founder involved) firms. These last two categories are expected to provide the closest match 
to multi-founder firms as they also contain the direct involvement of a firm founder.  
Table 4 provides the value of multi-founder firms relative to other categories of firms. 
Firm value is measured by Tobin’s Q and industry-adjusted Tobin’s Q. Panel A displays the 
average value for all categories of firms. Multi-founder firms have an average Tobin’s Q of 
1.27 and industry-adjusted Tobin’s Q of 1.11. This is the highest among all firm categories 
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for both measures. Panel B shows results of mean tests between multi-founder firms and 
various categories of other firms. We find that the industry-adjusted Tobin’s Q of multi-
founder firms is significantly higher than all other firms, all family-controlled and individual-
controlled firms as a group, and all family (founder involved) firms. The industry-adjusted 
result for individual (founder involved) firms is not significant but the difference in Tobin’s 
Q is significant. Panels C and D provide similar analysis for median Tobin’s Q. While the 
results are not as strong as those for mean Tobin’s Q, there is still evidence in Panel D that 
the median Tobin’s Q of multi-founder firms is significantly higher than that of individual 
(founder involved) firms. In summary, these results provide some initial evidence that multi-
founder firms are more valuable than other firms.  
 In Table 5 we examine differences in firm characteristics between multi-founder firms 
and other types of firms. Panel A shows average values for ownership, control wedge, board 
size, board control, board independence, chair-CEO duality, total assets, age and growth. In 
multi-founder firms the average ownership is 16.39 percent and average control wedge is 
1.04. The average board has 9.40 members and is made up of 39.85 percent of founders (and 
representatives) and 22.27 percent of independent board members. The same person holds the 
chairman and CEO positions in 46.51 percent of firms. The average multi-founder firm has 
NT$32.68 billion (≈US$1.1 billion) in total assets, has been founded for 16.93 years and is 
growing at 15.22 percent per annum.  
In Panel B, the mean tests show that multi-founder firms have lower ownership and 
control wedge, less board control, higher board independence, a greater incidence of 
chairman-CEO duality and are younger than all other firms, family and individual firms as a 
group and family (founder involved) firms. This analysis shows that multi-founder firms have 
different characteristics to these firms. However, in comparison to individual (founder 
involved) firms, there are fewer differences. Multi-founder firms have only higher board 
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control than individual (founder involved) firms. This suggests that multi-founder firms and 
individual (founder involved) firms are more closely matched on these (and potentially other) 
firm characteristics.  
 
5.2 Multivariate Tests 
In this section we examine the value of multi-founder firms relative to other types of firms, 
while controlling for other firm characteristics. Tobin’s Q is our measure of firm value. Our 
main variables of interest are a multi-founder dummy variable, equal to one if the firm is a 
multi-founder firm, and a continuous variable, multi-founders, which indicates the number of 
founders involved in multi-founder firms.7 We include controls for firm characteristics, such 
as the natural logarithm of total assets for firm size, the natural logarithm of the number of 
years since founding as firm age, debt is the ratio of debt to total assets, fixed assets is the 
ratio of fixed assets (PP&E) to total assets, growth is one-year growth in total assets and 
ROA is net income divided by total assets. The regressions also include industry sector 
dummy variables as defined in Table 1 and ownership and board variables as previously 
defined.8  
 Table 6 presents the results of our cross-sectional regression analysis. In the first 
regression the positive coefficient on the multi-founder dummy variable indicates that multi-
founder firms are more valuable than all other firms. In the second regression, the coefficient 
on multi-founders is positive, which indicates that the valuation premium for multi-founder 
firms grows with the number of founders that are involved.9 These results show that after 
                                                            
7 This variable ranges from 2 to 7 for multi-founder firms. It does not take a value of one for other firms with 
founders involved. 
8 As a robustness check we also use the 27 individual industry groups from the Taiwan Stock Exchange instead 
of our 5 industry sector categories with consistent results.  
9 We also test for a non-linear relationship between firm value and the number of founders that are involved in 
multi-founder firms. In unreported results the coefficient on the multi-founders2 variable is negative but 
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controlling for other firm characteristics, multi-founder firms are more valuable than other 
firms and the valuation premium is positively related to the number of founders involved in 
the firm.  
 As all other firms may not be the most appropriate comparison group for multi-
founder firms, we also repeat this analysis relative to family and individual firms as a group, 
family (founder involved) firms and individual (founder involved) firms. The results in 
regressions three to eight are all consistent. Multi-founder firms are more valuable than 
family and individual firms as a group, family (founder involved) firms and individual 
(founder involved) firms, with the valuation premium positively related to the number of 
founders involved in the firm. 10  As a measure of economic significance, the valuation 
premium relative to all other firms is 0.1463, which is a premium of 12.48 percent above the 
average Tobin’s Q of all other firms of 1.1722.  
 The coefficients on the control variables are consistent with prior research. We find 
negative relationships between board size, board control and firm value, consistent with 
Yermack (1996) and Yeh and Woidtke (2005). Firm size, firm age and return on assets are 
positively related to firm value, and the debt ratio is negatively related to firm value 
(Anderson and Reeb, 2003; Villalonga and Amit, 2006). In some specifications we also find 
that chairman-CEO duality is negatively related to firm value, consistent with Hermalin and 
Weisbach (2003), and ownership is negatively related to firm value, suggesting an 
entrenchment effect of high ownership (Anderson and Reeb, 2003).  
                                                                                                                                                                                        
insignificant and the coefficient on multi-founders is positive but insignificant in all four specifications in Table 
6. 
10 In unreported results we also include a dummy variable for family (founder involved) firms and a dummy 
variable for individual (founder involved) firms in the first regression in Table 6. We find the coefficient on the 
multi-founder firm dummy (0.1279) is significantly higher (p<0.05) than the coefficient on the family (founder 
involved) firm dummy (-0.0090) and significantly higher (p<0.01) than the coefficient on the individual 
(founder involved) firm dummy (-0.0997). This provides additional evidence that multi-founder firms are more 
valuable than these other categories of firms. 
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5.3 Additional Analysis 
To ensure the results are not due to specific conditions in 2007, we also repeat our analysis on 
our time-series sample. This sample includes 292 firm-year observations for multi-founder 
firms and 328 firm-year observations for individual (founder involved) firms over the period 
2001 to 2007. Due to the intensive data collection required for each firm-year observation 
this analysis is limited to multi-founder and individual (founder involved) firms. Individual 
(founder involved) firms are chosen as the most appropriate control group as they have the 
most common characteristics (see Table 5).  
 Table 7 Panel A displays the average Tobin’s Q for multi-founder and individual 
(founder involved) firms over this period. The mean tests indicate that multi-founder firms 
are more valuable than individual (founder involved) firms over the entire period (and in four 
out of the seven individual years). Table 7 Panel B displays the regression results for the 
time-series sample. In the first regression the coefficient on the multi-founder dummy 
variable is positive. In the second regression the coefficient on multi-founders is also 
positive. These results show that over the period 2001 to 2007, multi-founder firms are more 
valuable than individual (founder involved) firms, with the valuation premium positively 
related to the number of founders involved.  
 We also undertake further analysis to identify how the multiple founders are involved 
in multi-founder firms, relative to founders in other firms. Table 8 presents the incidence of 
founder involvement across firms in our cross-sectional sample. Founders on board is the 
number of founders in board positions (including the chairman and CEO positions). 11 
                                                            
11 This measures direct founder involvement, only positions actually held by founders, which is different to the 
number of board seats attributed to founders in Table 3. The number of board seats in Table 3 includes seats 
held by founders and their representatives.  
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Founders in management is the number of founders in management positions (including the 
CEO position). Founder chairman and founder CEO are indicator variables showing the 
presence of founders in these positions. Founder directors (excluding CEO) are the number of 
founders in board positions (excluding the CEO position). Founder managers (excluding 
CEO) is the number of founders in non-CEO management positions (vice-president 
positions).  
 Panel A shows that multi-founder firms have an average of 2.86 founders involved on 
the board and 1.56 founders involved in management. The results of mean tests in Panel B 
show that this involvement is significantly higher than all other types of firms. This confirms 
that there is greater founder involvement on the board and in management in multi-founder 
firms. The analysis also shows that 97.67 percent of multi-founder firms have a founder 
chairman and 81.40 percent of multi-founder firms have a founder CEO. The average multi-
founder firm also has another 2.05 founder directors and 0.74 founder managers (excluding 
founder CEOs).12 These results are significantly higher than all other types of firms, with 
only individual (founder involved) firms having a comparable number of founder chairmen.13  
 This analysis also shows that the multiple founders are involved in multi-founder 
firms in different positions. Our prior analysis in Tables 6 and 7 assumes that all multiple 
founder involvement is equivalent. In the following analysis we relax this assumption by 
including the following additional variables into our regression model – founder CEO, 
founder directors (excluding CEO) and founder managers (excluding CEO). 14  15   This 
                                                            
12  These founder managers are unique to multi-founder firms. We identify 18 multi-founder firms where 
founders are involved in vice-president positions (min=1, max=4) in addition to the presence of a founder CEO.  
13 The positive numbers for family (acquired) firms, individual (acquired) firms and company firms represent 
the original founders of these companies that stay involved after the firms were acquired.  
14 Since 97.67 percent of multi-founder firms have a founder chairman it is not possible to also include a 
founder chairman dummy in the regression specifications. 
15 These three measures identify direct founder involvement. The board control variable measures and controls 
for total involvement on the board by founders and their representatives (and other family members in family 
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analysis is similar to that of prior studies (Fahlenbrach, 2009; Li and Srinivasan, 2011; 
Villalonga and Amit, 2006), except that we also investigate the involvement of founders in 
non-CEO management positions (vice-president positions) and the involvement of founders 
in multiple, rather than single, director positions. There are two benefits to this analysis. First, 
to determine how the individual measures of founder involvement are related to firm value. 
Second, to see whether the inclusion of these founder involvement variables reduce the 
magnitude and significance of the multi-founder dummy variable. If the multi-founder 
dummy variable is no longer significant, this means the significant valuation premium multi-
founder firms have over other firms is primarily due to these measures of direct founder 
involvement.16 
 Table 9 presents the results of this analysis. In the first three regressions we find a 
negative coefficient on founder managers (excluding CEO). In the third and fourth 
regressions we find a positive coefficient on founder directors (excluding CEO). In the third 
regression, we also find a positive coefficient on founder CEO. While these results are not 
significant across all specifications, they indicate that founder CEOs and founder directors 
are positively associated with firm value, while founder managers are negatively associated 
with firm value. The founder CEO and founder director results are consistent with prior 
studies (Fahlenbrach, 2009; Li and Srinivasan, 2011; Villalonga and Amit, 2006). However, 
our results show that there are also benefits to having additional founders (e.g. second, third, 
fourth founder) involved as directors. The result for founder managers suggests that having 
founders involved as vice presidents in the day-to-day operations of firms (beyond founder 
involvement as the CEO) is harmful to shareholders. Overall, these results indicate that 
                                                                                                                                                                                        
firms). If we remove the board control variable from the analysis we obtain consistent results with those 
presented. 
16 In these model specifications the multi-founder dummy variable represents the remaining valuation effect that 
is unrelated to the director founder involvement variables, i.e. is due to other uncontrolled factors.  
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founder involvement is valuable when it is at the board and CEO level and not at the vice-
president level.  
 The results also show that the inclusion of the three founder involvement variables 
has little effect on the coefficient on the multi-founder dummy variable in regressions one 
and two. The coefficient is still positive relative to all firms and family and individual firms 
as a group. However, in regressions three to five, the coefficient on the multi-founder dummy 
is no longer significant relative to family (founder involved) firms and individual (founder 
involved) firms using the cross-sectional sample, and individual (founder involved) firms 
using the time series sample. Since individual (founder involved) firms are a closer match to 
multi-founder firms on a number of observable (and potentially unobserved) firm 
characteristics, this analysis shows that the valuation premium multi-founder firms have over 
individual (founder involved) firms is largely attributable to the direct involvement of the 
multiple founders. The unchanged results in regressions one and two are most likely due to 
the greater number of uncontrolled differences between multi-founder firms and these types 
of firms, which reinforces the need for a suitable control group in this type of analysis.  
 Finally, we believe that endogeneity has a limited effect on our analysis for the 
following reasons. With respect to omitted variable bias, the potential concern is that our 
documented valuation premium for multi-founder firms is attributable to other factors that we 
do not control for in our analysis. However, in Table 9 we show that the valuation premium 
relative to family (founder involved) firms and individual (founder involved) firms can be 
explained by the direct involvement of the multiple founders. Thus, we are confident that the 
valuation premium for multi-founder firms is primarily due to multiple founder 
involvement.17 With respect to reverse causality and self selection, we first note that the 
                                                            
17 In our time series sample there is very little change in direct founder involvement over the period so it is not 
possible to use fixed firm effects as another method to control for omitted variable bias. 
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multiple founders have been constantly involved in the firm since its founding, so they are 
not able to time their entrance to the firm. However, it is possible for founders to time their 
exit from the firm. Adams et al. (2009) specifically examine this endogeneity concern in 
single-founder firms and find that because founders can time their exit from firms, the effect 
of founder involvement on firm value is actually underestimated in OLS regressions. We are 
unable to find a suitable instrument to examine this further in multi-founder firms, but if 
multiple founders time their exit from firms in the same way as single founders then this 
results in a bias against our results. 18  In summary, we are confident that the valuation 
premium we document for multi-founder firms is due to the continued involvement of 
multiple founders.   
   
6. Conclusions 
Prior studies have examined the net valuation effect of a single founder involved as a CEO, 
director or chairman (Fahlenbrach, 2009; Li and Srinivasan, 2011; Villalonga and Amit, 
2006). In this paper, we highlight a previously unstudied category of firms – multi-founder 
firms – which provide us with a unique setting to shed further light on the net valuation 
effects of founder involvement. In particular, multi-founder firms provide us with the 
opportunity to examine the valuation effects of multiple founders involved as directors, CEOs 
and managers in the same firm. 
We find that multi-founder firms are more valuable than all other categories of firms, 
including single-founder firms and family firms, with the valuation premium positively 
related to the number of founders involved in the firm. Further analysis confirms that this 
                                                            
18 Prior studies have used the number of original founders or the number of dead founders as an instrument for 
single founder involvement in firms. In our analysis the number of original founders is usually the same as the 
number of founders currently involved. The number of dead founders is minimal as the average (median) firm 
age in our sample is 27 years (26 years) for all firms and 17 years (18 years) for multi-founder firms.  
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valuation premium is linked to the direct involvement of the multiple founders as directors 
and CEOs. However, further founder involvement in vice president positions has a negative 
relationship with firm value. 
 This paper makes a number of contributions to the literature. First, we progress the 
ownership literature by identifying a new category of firms that has not been previously 
studied. In recent years, authors have started to make increasingly finer distinctions between 
firms – family and sole founder firms (Miller et al., 2007), first and later generation family 
firms (Villalonga and Amit, 2006) and founded versus acquired family firms (Villalonga and 
Amit, 2010). This paper continues in this vein by identifying a new category of firms, multi-
founder firms, which are distinctly different from family-controlled or individual-controlled 
firms.  
 Second, prior studies of firm founders have focused on the involvement of an 
individual founder. This is the first paper to examine firms with multiple founder 
involvement. Our results show that there are incremental benefits to greater founder 
involvement, particularly when multiple founders are involved as CEOs and directors. 
Further research is needed to study this phenomenon in more detail. Some interesting 
questions include: How does additional founder involvement continue to provide a net benefit 
to shareholders? For example, how do additional founder directors provide even more 
valuable monitoring and advice above that provided by a founder CEO and/or a single 
founder director?  
 Third, our analysis specifically identifies founder involvement in vice president 
positions as being negatively associated with firm value. This result suggests that 
shareholders benefit the most when day-to-day operations are left to a single founder (as CEO) 
and other founders should concentrate their efforts toward higher level strategy and 
monitoring roles at the board level. Since this is the first study to examine the role of 
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founders in vice president positions, this result suggests that this is a fruitful avenue of 
research for future studies. 
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Table 1 – Firm Categories 
The sample comprises 716 firms listed on the Taiwan Stock Exchange that provided annual reports to the exchange for 
the year 2007 and have financial and ownership data available from the Taiwan Economic Journal (TEJ) database. 
Multi-founder firms are firms that were founded by multiple individuals with no family relationships and the same 
group or a subgroup of the same founders still control the firm. Family firms are firms where a family group is in 
control. A family group is defined as more than one family member on the board of directors or in top management. 
Individual firms are where an individual is in control and there is no involvement by their other family members on the 
board of directors or in top management. Company firms are firms where another company is in control and the 
ultimate ownership of that company cannot be traced to a particular controlling shareholder. Government firms are 
firms where the state is in control. Widely held firm are firms where no identifiable person or group holds more than 
one board seat. Family and individual firms are further categorized as founder involved, founder not involved and 
acquired. For example, a family firm (founder involved) is one in which the family group currently in control was also 
involved in originally founding the firm and a founding family member is still involved on the board of directors or in 
management. A family firm (founder not involved) is one in which the family group currently in control was also 
involved in originally founding the firm but all founding family members are no longer involved on the board of 
directors or in management. Acquired family firms are firms where a family group is currently in control but this 
family group was not involved in founding the firm. Industry sectors use industry classifications from the Taiwan 
Stock Exchange. Electronics = 13,14,15,16,17,18,19,20. Materials = 1,8,9,10,11,21. Consumer = 2,24,26. 
Industrials=3,4,5,6,7,12,22,23,27. Financial=25.   
 
Firm Categories n 
Industry Sectors 
Electronics Materials Consumer  Industrials Financial
Multi-founder 43 88% 0% 0% 12% 0% 
Family (founder involved) 289 51% 6% 3% 39% 1% 
Family (not involved) 160 22% 16% 11% 43% 8% 
Family (acquired) 88 44% 8% 4% 36% 8% 
Individual (founder involved) 47 89% 2% 2% 6% 0% 
Individual (not involved) 6 100% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
Individual (acquired) 10 90% 10% 0% 0% 0% 
Company 35 31% 6% 6% 46% 11% 
Government 25 12% 20% 4% 36% 28% 
Widely-held 13 84% 0% 8% 0% 8% 
All Firms 716 48% 8% 5% 34% 5% 
 
29 
 
Table 2 – Summary Statistics 
Summary statistics of sample firms. The sample comprises 716 firms listed on the Taiwan Stock Exchange that 
provided annual reports to the exchange for the year 2007 and have financial and ownership data available from 
the Taiwan Economic Journal (TEJ) database. Tobin’s Q is calculated as total assets minus the book value of 
equity plus the market value of equity all divided by total assets. Industry adjusted Tobin’s Q is raw Tobin’s Q 
divided by industry average Tobin’s Q. Total assets is in billions of NT dollars. Age is the number of years since 
the firm was founded. Ownership is the percentage cashflow rights ownership of the controlling group. Control 
wedge is the ratio of control to cashflow rights of the controlling group. Board size is the number of directors 
and supervisors on the board. Board control is the percentage of board positions held by the controlling group. 
Board independence is the percentage of independent directors and supervisors on the board. Chair-CEO duality 
is the percentage of firms where the same person holds both positions. Debt is total debt divided by total assets.  
Fixed assets is PP&E divided by total assets. Growth is 1-year growth in total assets as a percentage. ROA is 
return on assets as a percentage. Tobin’s Q and other firm financial characteristics (debt, fixed assets, growth, 
ROA) are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles. 
 
 Mean Median Min Max Std 
Tobin’s Q 1.18 1.12 0.08 5.01 0.41 
Industry-adjusted Tobin’s Q 1.00 0.98 0.24 4.81 0.34 
Total Assets (NT$ billions) 29.80 6.24 0.08 1702.66 99.98 
Age 27.05 26.00 1.00 76.00 13.61 
Ownership (%) 22.92 20.03 0.16 81.43 16.71 
Control Wedge 1.56 1.02 1.00 9.03 1.28 
Board Size 9.96 9.00 6.00 25.00 2.98 
Board Control (%) 47.68 42.26 5.26 100.00 25.26 
Board Independence (%) 11.09 0.00 0.00 62.50 14.82 
Chair-CEO duality (%) 33.10 0.00 0.00 100.00 0.47 
Debt 0.56 0.40 0.03 1.00 0.19 
Fixed Assets 0.11 0.05 0.00 1.00 0.18 
Growth (%) 14.30 3.12 -91.60 249.91 41.13 
ROA (%) 9.75 10.73 -52.20 58.48 18.45 
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Table 3 – Multi-founder Firms 
This table shows details of the 43 multi-founder firms listed on the Taiwan Stock Exchange that provided annual 
reports to the exchange for the year 2007 and have financial and ownership data available from the Taiwan 
Economic Journal (TEJ) database. Multi-founder firms are firms that were founded by multiple individuals with 
no family relationships and the same group or a subgroup of the same founders still control the firm. Number of 
founders is the number of founders involved in each firm. Ownership is the percentage cashflow rights 
ownership of each founder. Board seats are the number of board seats held by each founder (and their 
representatives). Management is the number of management positions held by each founder.  
 
 n Mean Median Min Max Std 
No. founders 43 2.86 2.00 2.00 7.00 1.15 
Total ownership 43 16.39 13.87 1.49 41.08 9.78 
Founder 1 ownership 43 7.97 6.11 0.00 34.75 6.11 
Founder 2 ownership 43 4.15 3.65 0.00 14.41 3.26 
Founder 3 ownership 21 3.09 2.30 0.03 12.42 2.67 
Founder 4 ownership 10 2.50 2.44 0.29 5.09 1.42 
Founder 5 ownership 4 1.79 1.94 0.97 2.32 0.58 
Founder 6 ownership 1 1.23 1.23 1.23 1.23 - 
Founder 7 ownership 1 0.48 0.48 0.48 0.48 - 
Joint ownership 7 20.25 13.41 0.56 56.71 20.73 
Total board seats 43 3.63 3.00 2.00 8.00 1.57 
Founder 1 board seats 43 1.23 1.00 1.00 4.00 0.57 
Founder 2 board seats 43 1.11 1.00 1.00 2.00 0.32 
Founder 3 board seats 21 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 - 
Founder 4 board seats 10 1.20 1.00 1.00 2.00 0.42 
Founder 5 board seats 4 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 - 
Founder 6 board seats 1 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 - 
Founder 7 board seats 1 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 - 
Joint board seats 5 2.00 2.00 1.00 3.00 1.00 
Total management 43 1.56 1.00 0.00 5.00 1.22 
Founder 1 management 43 0.60 1.00 0.00 1.00 0.49 
Founder 2 management 43 0.51 1.00 0.00 1.00 0.51 
Founder 3 management 21 0.62 1.00 0.00 1.00 0.50 
Founder 4 management 10 0.30 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.48 
Founder 5 management 4 0.75 1.00 0.00 1.00 0.50 
Founder 6 management 1 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 - 
Founder 7 management 1 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 - 
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Table 4 – Firm Value 
Value of multi-founder firms relative to other firm types. The sample comprises 716 firms listed on the 
Taiwan Stock Exchange that provided annual reports to the exchange for the year 2007 and have financial 
and ownership data available from the Taiwan Economic Journal (TEJ) database. Panel A displays mean 
values for Tobin’s Q and industry-adjusted Tobin’s Q. Tobin’s Q is calculated as total assets minus the 
book value of equity plus the market value of equity all divided by total assets. Industry adjusted Tobin’s 
Q is raw Tobin’s Q divided by industry average Tobin’s Q. Panel B shows t-statistics for difference in 
means tests between multi-founder firms and other types of firms. Panel C displays median values for 
Tobin’s Q and industry-adjusted Tobin’s Q. Panel D shows Mann-Whitney u-statistics for rank sum tests 
between multi-founder firms and other types of firms. Tobin’s Q is winsorized at the 1st and 99th 
percentiles. Significance is noted for * 10%, ** 5% and *** 1% levels.  
 
 Tobin’s Q Industry-adjusted Tobin’s Q 
Panel A – Means   
Multi-founder 1.27 1.11 
Family (founder involved) 1.18 0.99 
Family (not involved) 1.19 1.01 
Family (acquired) 1.18 1.00 
Individual (founder involved) 1.08 0.95 
Individual (not involved) 1.08 0.98 
Individual (acquired) 1.22 1.01 
Company 1.10 0.95 
Government 1.19 0.97 
Widely-held 1.15 0.98 
Panel B – Mean Test t-statistics   
Multi-founder – All firms 1.57 2.16** 
Multi-founder – Family & Individual 1.32 1.90* 
Multi-founder – Family (founder involved) 1.22 1.82* 
Multi-founder – Individual (founder involved) 1.79* 1.59 
Panel C – Medians   
Multi-founder 1.11 0.99 
Family (founder involved) 1.12 0.96 
Family (not involved) 1.16 1.00 
Family (acquired) 1.09 0.98 
Individual (founder involved) 1.06 0.96 
Individual (not involved) 1.07 0.98 
Individual (acquired) 1.13 0.99 
Company 1.15 1.00 
Government 1.17 1.00 
Widely-held 1.04 0.97 
Panel D – Mann-Whitney Test u-statistics   
Multi-founder – All firms 0.19 0.61 
Multi-founder – Family & Individual 0.19 0.59 
Multi-founder – Family (founder involved) 0.09 0.56 
Multi-founder – Individual (founder involved) 1.67* 0.99 
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Table 5 – Firm Characteristics 
Firm characteristics of multi-founder firms relative to other firm types. The sample comprises 716 firms listed on the Taiwan Stock Exchange that provided annual reports to 
the exchange for the year 2007 and have financial and ownership data available from the Taiwan Economic Journal (TEJ) database. Panel A displays mean values for 
ownership (percentage cashflow rights ownership of the controlling group), control wedge (ratio of control to cashflow rights of the controlling group), board size (the 
number of directors and supervisors on the board), board control (the percentage of board positions held by the controlling group), board independence (the percentage of 
independent directors and supervisors on the board), Chair-CEO duality (percentage of firms where the same person holds both positions), total assets (in billions of NT 
dollars), Age (years since founding) and Growth (1-year growth in total assets as a percentage). Panel B shows t-statistics for difference in means tests between multi-founder 
firms and other types of firms. Significance is noted for * 10%, ** 5% and *** 1% levels.  
 
 Ownership Control Wedge 
Board 
Size 
Board 
Control 
Board 
Independence
Chair-CEO 
 duality 
Total 
Assets Age Growth 
Panel A – Means          
Multi-founder 16.39 1.04 9.40 39.85 22.27 46.51 32.68 16.93 15.22 
Family (founder involved) 25.92 1.26 9.46 45.56 10.94 40.14 26.47 26.30 15.55 
Family (not involved) 25.16 1.83 10.46 62.33 6.44 20.00 41.20 33.73 15.67 
Family (acquired) 20.16 1.99 10.16 50.93 9.07 25.00 23.55 29.41 14.01 
Individual (founder involved) 13.02 2.00 9.28 18.91 20.58 51.06 22.83 16.72 31.69 
Individual (not involved) 1.74 5.00 10.00 35.44 18.10 33.33 34.94 15.66 5.61 
Individual (acquired) 7.46 3.63 9.10 38.62 22.14 20.00 25.59 23.10 12.18 
Company 26.18 1.00 10.17 45.99 9.38 34.29 11.31 27.71 26.03 
Government 27.42 1.33 14.12 62.82 4.13 8.00 51.87 23.10 2.93 
Widely-held 8.87 1.00 9.77 10.47 19.01 38.46 29.80 21.62 13.33 
Panel B – Mean Test t-statistics          
Multi-founder – All firms -2.64*** -1.88* -1.26 -2.10** 5.23*** 1.94* 0.19 -5.12*** 0.10 
Multi-founder – Family & Individual -2.62*** -1.97** -0.96 -2.20** 5.08*** 1.81* 0.18 -5.27*** 0.15 
Multi-founder – Family (founder involved) -3.47*** -2.03** -0.19 -1.64* 4.70*** 0.79 0.34 -5.91*** -0.05 
Multi-founder – Individual (founder involved) 1.48 -1.22 0.30 5.56*** 0.48 -0.43 0.46 0.13 -1.33 
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Table 6 – Cross-sectional Regressions 
Regressions relate Tobin’s Q to multi-founder and control variables using the full sample and different sub-samples. The sample comprises 716 firms listed on the Taiwan 
Stock Exchange that provided annual reports to the exchange for the year 2007 and have financial and ownership data available from the Taiwan Economic Journal (TEJ) 
database. Tobin’s Q is calculated as total assets minus the book value of equity plus the market value of equity all divided by total assets. Multi-founder dummy is a dummy 
variable equal to one if the firm is a multi-founder firm. Multi-founders is a continuous variables indicating the number of founders involved in multi-founder firms. Control 
variables include: ownership (percentage cashflow rights ownership of the controlling group), control wedge (ratio of control to cashflow rights of the controlling group), 
board size (the number of directors and supervisors on the board), board control (the percentage of board positions held by the controlling group), board independence (the 
percentage of independent directors and supervisors on the board), Chair-CEO duality (percentage of firms where the same person holds both positions), natural logarithm of 
total assets (in billions of NT dollars), natural logarithm of age (years since founding), debt (total debt divided by total assets), fixed assets (PP&E divided by total assets), 
growth (1-year growth in total assets as a percentage), ROA (return on assets) and industry dummy variables. Tobin’s Q and other firm financial characteristics (debt, fixed 
assets, growth, ROA) are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles. T-statistics are shown in parentheses. Significance is noted for * 10%, ** 5% and *** 1% levels. 
 
 Tobin’s Q 
 All Firms Family &  Individual Firms 
Family Firms 
 (founder involved) 
Individual Firms 
(founder involved) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Intercept 0.4753 (2.05)** 
0.4806 
(2.07)** 
0.4868 
(1.92)* 
0.4923 
(1.94)* 
0.8822 
(1.96)* 
0.9035 
(2.01)** 
0.2643 
(0.29) 
0.4171 
(0.46) 
Multi-founder dummy 0.1463 (2.28)**  
0.1513 
(2.29)**  
0.1571 
(1.92)*  
0.2304 
(1.70)*  
Multi-founders  0.0496 (2.40)**  
0.0507 
(2.39)**  
0.0518 
(2.01)**  
0.0901 
(2.05)** 
Ownership -0.0009 (-0.84) 
-0.0009 
(-0.86) 
-0.0011 
(-1.00) 
-0.0011 
(-1.02) 
-0.0035 
(-1.99)** 
-0.0035 
(-2.01)** 
-0.0046 
(-0.81) 
-0.0052 
(-0.92) 
Control Wedge 0.0023 (0.27) 
0.0021 
(0.26) 
0.0025 
(0.29) 
0.0023 
(0.27) 
0.0546 
(1.33) 
0.0539 
(1.31) 
0.0028 
(0.17) 
0.0021 
(0.14) 
Board Size -0.0103 (-1.83)* 
-0.0107 
(-1.89)* 
-0.0089 
(-1.41) 
-0.0094 
(-1.48) 
-0.0203 
(-1.55) 
-0.0217 
(-1.66)* 
0.0139 
(0.44) 
-0.0006 
(-0.02) 
Board Control -0.1605 (-2.24)** 
-0.1652 
(-2.31)** 
-0.1573 
(-1.99)** 
-0.1632 
(-2.06)** 
-0.0508 
(-0.38) 
-0.0647 
(-0.48) 
-0.4387 
(-1.22) 
-0.5862 
(-1.55) 
Board Independence 0.0512 (0.44) 
0.0517 
(0.44) 
0.0361 
(0.29) 
0.0374 
(0.30) 
-0.0201 
(-0.11) 
-0.0169 
(-0.09) 
-0.0892 
(-0.26) 
-0.0957 
(-0.28) 
Chair-CEO duality -0.0371 (-1.15) 
-0.0386 
(-1.20) 
-0.0411 
(-1.20) 
-0.0427 
(-1.24) 
-0.0494 
(-0.94) 
-0.0525 
(-1.00) 
-0.0797 
(-0.69) 
-0.0882 
(-0.78) 
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Ln(Total Assets) 0.0414 (3.18)*** 
0.0418 
(3.21)*** 
0.0375 
(2.63)*** 
0.0381 
(2.67)*** 
0.0161 
(0.67) 
0.0172 
(0.72) 
0.0452 
(0.91) 
0.0510 
(1.04) 
Ln(Age) 0.0701 (2.42)** 
0.0684 
(2.36)** 
0.0822 
(2.60)*** 
0.0801 
(2.54)** 
0.1036 
(1.96)* 
0.0979 
(1.87)* 
0.1038 
(1.02) 
0.0773 
(0.77) 
Debt -0.1214 (-2.63)*** 
-0.1208 
(-2.62)*** 
-0.1265 
(-2.47)** 
-0.1254 
(-2.45)** 
-0.2161 
(-2.09)** 
-0.2118 
(-2.05)** 
-0.1462 
(-0.69) 
-0.1179 
(-0.56) 
Fixed Assets 0.0502 (0.50) 
0.0510 
(0.51) 
0.1038 
(0.93) 
0.1050 
(0.94) 
-0.0691 
(-0.34) 
-0.0700 
(-0.35) 
-0.2198 
(-0.24) 
-0.2543 
(-0.28) 
Growth 0.0002 (0.66) 
0.0002 
(0.65) 
0.0001 
(0.25) 
0.0001 
(0.25) 
0.0006 
(0.98) 
0.0006 
(0.98) 
-0.0005 
(-0.57) 
-0.0006 
(-0.64) 
ROA 0.0027 (2.93)*** 
0.0026 
(2.88)*** 
0.0031 
(3.06)*** 
0.0030 
(3.00)*** 
0.0020 
(1.25) 
0.0019 
(1.20) 
-0.0016 
(-0.47) 
-0.0019 
(-0.56) 
Industry dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Adj-R2 0.115 0.115 0.106 0.107 0.084 0.085 0.089 0.105 
n 716 716 643 643 332 332 90 90 
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Table 7 – Time Series Evidence 
This table uses our time series sample, which includes 292 firm-year observations for multi-
founder firms and 328 firm-year observations for individual (founder involved) firms over the 
period 2001 to 2007. Tobin’s Q is calculated as total assets minus the book value of equity plus 
the market value of equity all divided by total assets. Panel A displays mean values for Tobin’s Q 
and shows t-statistics for difference in means tests between multi-founder firms and individual 
(founder involved) firms. Panel B shows regressions relating Tobin’s Q to multi-founder and 
control variables. Multi-founder dummy is a dummy variable equal to one if the firm is a multi-
founder firm. Multi-founders is a continuous variables indicating the number of founders involved 
in multi-founder firms. Control variables include: ownership (percentage cashflow rights 
ownership of the controlling group), control wedge (ratio of control to cashflow rights of the 
controlling group), board size (the number of directors and supervisors on the board), board 
control (the percentage of board positions held by the controlling group), board independence (the 
percentage of independent directors and supervisors on the board), Chair-CEO duality (percentage 
of firms where the same person holds both positions), natural logarithm of total assets (in billions 
of NT dollars), natural logarithm of age (years since founding), debt (total debt divided by total 
assets), fixed assets (PP&E divided by total assets), growth (1-year growth in total assets as a 
percentage), ROA (return on assets) and industry dummy variables. Year dummies are dummy 
variables equal to one for the years 2001 to 2006. Tobin’s Q and other firm financial 
characteristics (debt, fixed assets, growth, ROA) are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles. 
Standard errors are clustered at the firm level. T-statistics are shown in parentheses. Significance 
is noted for * 10%, ** 5% and *** 1% levels. 
 
Panel A – Mean Tests 
 Tobin’s Q  
Year Multi-founder firms Individual Firms (founder involved) 
Mean Test 
t-statistics 
2001 1.15 1.03 2.19** 
2002 1.15 1.09 0.74 
2003 1.10 1.06 0.72 
2004 1.16 1.11 0.83 
2005 1.17 1.05 1.95* 
2006 1.19 1.02 2.23** 
2007 1.27 1.08 1.79* 
All years 1.17 1.06 3.96*** 
 
 
Panel B – Regressions 
 Tobin’s Q 
 (1) (2) 
Intercept 1.1921 (5.70)*** 
1.2313 
(5.51)*** 
Multi-founder dummy 0.1071 (2.30)**  
Multi-founders  0.0310 (2.39)** 
Ownership -0.0010 (-0.59) 
-0.0013 
(-0.76) 
Control Wedge -0.0011 (-0.35) 
-0.0019 
(-0.62) 
Board Size -0.0080 (-0.85) 
-0.0121 
(-1.25) 
Board Control -0.1774 -0.1829 
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(-1.62) (-1.63) 
Board Independence 0.0815 (0.63) 
0.0861 
(0.67) 
Chair-CEO duality -0.0323 (-0.72) 
-0.0387 
(-0.86) 
Ln(Total Assets) 0.0126 (0.81) 
0.0147 
(0.90) 
Ln(Age) -0.0254 (-0.40) 
-0.0323 
(-0.49) 
Debt -0.1178 (-2.39)** 
-0.1131 
(-2.25)** 
Fixed Assets -0.0783 (-0.54) 
-0.0817 
(-0.57) 
Growth 0.0001 (0.59) 
0.0001 
(0.67) 
ROA 0.0002 (0.40) 
0.0002 
(0.37) 
Industry dummies Yes Yes 
Year dummies  Yes Yes 
Adj-R2 0.107 0.104 
n 620 620 
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Table 8 – Founder Involvement 
Founder involvement in multi-founder firms relative to other firm types. The sample comprises 716 firms listed on the Taiwan Stock Exchange that provided 
annual reports to the exchange for the year 2007 and have financial and ownership data available from the Taiwan Economic Journal (TEJ) database. Panel A 
displays mean values for the number of founders on the board, number of founders in management, presence of a founder chairman (as a percentage), presence of 
a founder CEO (as a percentage), number of founder directors (excluding the CEO) and the number of founder managers (excluding the CEO). Panel B shows t-
statistics for difference in means tests between multi-founder firms and other types of firms. Significance is noted for * 10%, ** 5% and *** 1% levels. 
 
 
Founders 
on 
Board 
Founders 
in 
 Management 
Founder 
Chairman 
(%) 
Founder 
CEO 
(%) 
Founder  
Directors 
(excl. CEO) 
Founder 
Managers 
(excl. CEO) 
Panel A – Means       
Multi-founder 2.86 1.56 97.67 81.40 2.05 0.74 
Family (founder involved) 1.00 0.51 86.16 50.52 0.49 - 
Family (not involved) - - - - - - 
Family (acquired) 0.17 0.05 7.95 4.55 0.13 - 
Individual (founder involved) 1.00 0.51 89.36 51.06 0.49 - 
Individual (not involved) - - - - - - 
Individual (acquired) 0.30 0.10 10.00 10.00 0.20 - 
Company 0.06 - - - 0.06 - 
Government - - - - - - 
Widely-held - - - - - - 
Panel B – Mean Test t-statistics       
Multi-founder – All firms 13.26*** 6.90*** 6.70*** 7.89*** 10.68*** 18.60*** 
Multi-founder – Family & Individual 12.91*** 6.72*** 5.97*** 7.16*** 10.50*** 17.56*** 
Multi-founder – Family (founder involved) 10.65*** 5.59*** 2.15*** 3.87*** 9.19*** 12.17*** 
Multi-founder – Individual (founder involved) 10.65*** 5.23*** 1.58 3.16*** 8.56*** 4.87*** 
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Table 9 – Founder Involvement Regressions 
Regressions relate Tobin’s Q to multi-founder and control variables using the full sample and different sub-
samples. Tobin’s Q is calculated as total assets minus the book value of equity plus the market value of equity 
all divided by total assets. Multi-founder dummy is a dummy variable equal to one if the firm is a multi-founder 
firm. Founder CEO is a dummy variable equal to one when a founder holds this position. Founder directors 
(excl. CEO) and founder managers (excl. CEO) are the number of founders in these positions (excluding the 
CEO). Control variables include: ownership (percentage cashflow rights ownership of the controlling group), 
control wedge (ratio of control to cashflow rights of the controlling group), board size (the number of directors 
and supervisors on the board), board control (the percentage of board positions held by the controlling group), 
board independence (the percentage of independent directors and supervisors on the board), Chair-CEO duality 
(percentage of firms where the same person holds both positions), natural logarithm of total assets (in billions of 
NT dollars), natural logarithm of age (years since founding), debt (total debt divided by total assets), fixed assets 
(PP&E divided by total assets), growth (1-year growth in total assets as a percentage), ROA (return on assets) 
and industry dummy variables. Specifications 1 to 4 use the cross-sectional sample (716 firms in 2007). 
Specification 5 uses the time series sample (620 firm-year observations over the period 2001 to 2007). Tobin’s 
Q and other firm financial characteristics (debt, fixed assets, growth, ROA) are winsorized at the 1st and 99th 
percentiles. Standard errors are clustered at the firm level. T-statistics are shown in parentheses. Significance is 
noted for * 10%, ** 5% and *** 1% levels. 
 
 Tobin’s Q 
 All Firms 
Family &  
Individual 
Firms 
Family 
Firms 
 (founder 
involved) 
Individual 
Firms 
(founder 
involved) 
Individual 
Firms 
(founder 
involved) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Intercept 0.4441 (1.86)* 
0.4534 
(1.74)* 
0.5413 
(1.15) 
0.0475 
(0.05) 
1.1475 
(5.30)*** 
Multi-founder dummy 0.1998 (2.16)** 
0.2042 
(2.14)** 
0.0124 
(0.09) 
0.0574 
(0.31) 
0.0837 
(1.46) 
Founder CEO -0.0009 (-0.02) 
0.0001 
(0.01) 
0.2019 
(2.06)** 
0.2197 
(1.26) 
0.0491 
(0.87) 
Founder Directors 
(excl. CEO) 
0.0241 
(0.73) 
0.0243 
(0.69) 
0.1524 
(1.98)** 
0.1584 
(1.69)* 
0.0206 
(0.82) 
Founder Managers 
(excl. CEO) 
-0.1312 
(-2.13)** 
-0.1311 
(-2.07)** 
-0.2143 
(-2.54)** 
-0.1452 
(-1.44) 
-0.0287 
(-0.85) 
Ownership -0.0009 (-0.84) 
-0.0011 
(-1.00) 
-0.0035 
(-2.01)** 
-0.0040 
(-0.69) 
-0.0008 
(-0.51) 
Control Wedge 0.0023 (0.27) 
0.0026 
(0.30) 
0.0556 
(1.34) 
0.0026 
(0.16) 
-0.0010 
(-0.33) 
Board Size -0.0097 (-1.71)* 
-0.0082 
(-1.29) 
-0.0195 
(-1.48) 
0.0019 
(0.06) 
-0.0085 
(-0.81) 
Board Control -0.1489 (-2.06)** 
-0.1426 
(-1.78)* 
-0.0554 
(-0.41) 
-0.5847 
(-1.53) 
-0.1874 
(-1.65)* 
Board Independence 0.0647 (0.55) 
0.0514 
(0.41) 
0.0455 
(0.25) 
0.0237 
(0.07) 
0.0998 
(0.75) 
Chair-CEO duality -0.0224 (-0.61) 
-0.0252 
(-0.64) 
-0.0602 
(-0.93) 
-0.0770 
(-0.50) 
-0.0408 
(-0.76) 
Ln(Total Assets) 0.0413 (3.13)*** 
0.0373 
(2.59)*** 
0.0256 
(1.05) 
0.0591 
(1.17) 
0.0142 
(0.93) 
Ln(Age) 0.0725 (2.50)** 
0.0848 
(2.68)*** 
0.0998 
(1.89)* 
0.0676 
(0.65) 
-0.0303 
(-0.46) 
Debt -0.1199 (-2.58)*** 
-0.1256 
(-2.44)** 
-0.1899 
(-1.84)* 
-0.0805 
(-0.38) 
-0.1162 
(-2.25)** 
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Fixed Assets 0.0506 (0.51) 
0.1021 
(0.91) 
-0.0845 
(-0.42) 
-0.3664 
(-0.41) 
-0.0648 
(-0.44) 
Growth 0.0002 (0.72) 
0.0001 
(0.30) 
0.0007 
(1.19) 
-0.0003 
(-0.34) 
0.0001 
(0.60) 
ROA 0.0027 (3.03)*** 
0.0032 
(3.15)*** 
0.0019 
(1.25) 
-0.0023 
(-0.68) 
0.0003 
(0.44) 
Industry dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year dummies     Yes 
Adj-R2 0.117 0.108 0.097 0.098 0.106 
n 716 643 332 90 620 
 
 
 
 
